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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are accused of a federal crime and arrested by the
United States Marshals. Once the Marshals have you in custody, they
will take your “mug shot.”1 You will be photographed facing forward
† B.A., University of Utah, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2014; Managing
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 99. This Note benefited greatly from the guidance and
insight of Professors Sherry Colb and Cynthia Farina. Thanks to Stephanie An, Kelsey
Baldwin, Catherine Eisenhut, Zachary Glantz, Minsuk Han, Lucas McNamara, Sue Pado,
Derek Stueben, Joshua Wesneski, and the other members of the Cornell Law Review for
their hard work and good nature. Finally, I am grateful to my family for their steadfast
support and patience.
1
See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477
(E.D. La. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and in profile, in front of a background with lines that mark height.2
Under your face, you will hold a sign bearing a unique criminal identification number assigned to you by the United States Marshals Service
(USMS).3 In addition to this information, the photograph obviously
will show your general appearance and facial expression at the moment at which it is taken.
Undoubtedly, you would not want this image to be publicized. A
mug shot “captures the subject in [a] vulnerable and embarrassing
moment[ ]”4 and serves as a powerful visual indicator of criminality.5
If your mug shot were released, the public would quickly infer from
the image that law enforcement detained you because you had committed a crime.6 You would likely suffer grave personal and professional consequences if your mug shot became available for all to see.7
If your mug shot were released to the public, you would find it
nearly impossible to contain this damage completely. Because of the
sensational and memorable nature of mug shots, the negative public
opinion created by a publicized mug shot would likely persist even if
you were cleared of all charges and the image was removed from all
sources of publication.8 Worse, you might not actually be able to get
the image removed at all.9 One local jurisdiction opted to stop post2
Id. The side-by-side front and profile pictures are now easily recognizable, “standard” mug shots. See SANDRA S. PHILLIPS ET AL., POLICE PICTURES: THE PHOTOGRAPH AS
EVIDENCE 20 (1997).
3
See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
4
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011).
5
See JONATHAN FINN, CAPTURING THE CRIMINAL IMAGE: FROM MUG SHOT TO SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 1 (2009). In fact, mug shots historically have been the subject of study by
scientists seeking to prove that one’s physical appearance provides clues of innate criminal
tendencies. See id. at 11–30; PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 2, at 14–23.
6
See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (“Mug shots in general are
notorious for their visual association of the person with criminal activity.”).
7
See FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST
CONTESTED RIGHT 256 (2009) (detailing the potential effect of information online on individuals’ “professional well-being” given that many companies include Internet searches of
applicants’ names in their routine hiring procedures); Adam Tanner, Shakedown or Public
Service? Mug Shot Websites Spread, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:13 AM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/09/20/net-us-usa-internet-mugshots-idUSBRE88J0R020120920 (interviewing a woman whose mug shot for a DUI arrest made its way onto several web sites and
showed up in the results list for Internet searches for her name, causing complications in
her search for a new job and in a new romantic relationship).
8
A great many websites exist for the sole purpose of collecting and preserving mug
shots that have been released publicly. These websites offer little, if any, context for the
arrest and are often not updated to indicate whether the subject was ultimately convicted
or acquitted of the charged crime. See, e.g., BUSTED! MUGSHOTS, http://www.bustedmug
shots.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (providing mug shots and criminal record information to subscribers); THE SMOKING GUN, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/mugshots (last
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (publicizing mug shots of “celebrities and civilians,” which are divided
into various categories).
9
For example, an Ohio woman won a civil judgment against a man who had falsely
accused her of theft, only to find that she would have to pay anwhere between $100 to $500
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ing mug shots on its public website because tabloids and other websites were publishing those mug shots and then charging the arrestees
hundreds of dollars to have their mug shots removed—even if they
were ultimately found innocent of the crime for which they had been
arrested.10 Worse still, even with the full cooperation of the website
on which it was originally posted, an image posted online may be subsequently copied to other locations, making it impossible to delete
that image from all locations.11 Your mug shot might be forever preserved online, allowing anyone with Internet access to search for it.
Clearly, the consequences of having a mug shot publicized can be
damaging and far-reaching for the innocent and the guilty alike.
Perhaps in light of these considerations, the Department of Justice (DOJ) states in its official guidelines that the USMS should not
release mug shots to the public unless the release would serve a “law
enforcement function.”12 Generally, therefore, when the USMS receives a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the release of
mug shots in its possession, it refuses that request.13
Until recently, the USMS made a key exception to its general rule
of nondisclosure: if a FOIA request for a mug shot came from within
the Sixth Circuit, the USMS would release that image.14 And once the
mug shot was released to one individual or organization within the
Sixth Circuit, it could then be disseminated into other circuits and

for mug shot websites to remove her photograph from their public archives. The woman
eventually sued the websites on publicity-rights grounds because they were profiting from
the use of her image. See Christopher Connelly, Mug Shot Websites Charge When You’re
Charged, for Now, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 23, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
thetwo-way/2012/12/23/167916738/mug-shot-websites-charge-when-youre-charged-fornow; see also David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that mug shot removal is now a “mini-industry” that is “nearly as
opaque as the one it is intended to counter,” namely, mug shot publication websites).
10
See Pat Reavy, Sheriff Pulls Mug Shots Offline to Stop “Extortion” Websites, DESERET NEWS,
(Jan. 10, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865570390/Sheriff-pullsmug-shots-offline-to-stop-extortion-websites.html?pg=all (quoting Salt Lake County Sheriff
Jim Winder as saying that “once those mug shots are on the Internet, they never really
disappear” because they could “very easily . . . show up on another [website],” even when
the subjects opt to pay for the removal).
11
See LANE, supra note 7, at 234 (“As many, many people have discovered, it is far too
easy for information to be copied from one location on the Web to another or to be spread
around the globe in a seemingly endless string of forwarded e-mails.”).
12
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(7) (2013).
13
See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to All U.S. Marshals 2–3 (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Auerbach Memo], available at http://
www.usmarshals.gov/foia/policy/booking_photos.pdf.
14
See id. at 2 (explaining the exception for Sixth Circuit FOIA requests to accommodate that circuit’s holding in Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 99 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
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beyond.15 The USMS made this exception to its usual policy because
of a split in opinion among the federal Courts of Appeals.16 Three
circuit courts have weighed in on the question of whether the USMS
must release mug shots in response to a FOIA request, and they have
reached two different answers to the question.17 The courts disagree
about whether an arrestee has a privacy interest in his or her mug shot
that is sufficient to outweigh any public interest that would be served
by releasing the mug shot. The Sixth Circuit has long held that arrestees enjoy no such privacy interest.18 But both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held more recently that arrestees enjoy a significant
privacy interest and that the USMS may categorically refuse to release
mug shots to FOIA requesters.19
In December of 2012, this exception was all but eliminated. A
memorandum from the DOJ’s Office of the General Counsel advised
all Marshals that “effective immediately, the USMS will not disclose
booking photographs under the FOIA, regardless of where the FOIA
request originated.”20 This means that the USMS will no longer follow the Sixth Circuit precedent requiring the release of mug shots
upon FOIA request. This policy shift added a layer of complexity to
15
Some debate exists as to whether the USMS itself would release a mug shot to subsequent requesters once it already has released a particular image to a requester from the
Sixth Circuit. Compare Josh Gerstein, Court Ruling Keeps Federal Mugshots Secret, POLITICO
(Feb. 22, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/02/
court-ruling-keeps-federal-mugshots-secret-115210.html (yes, the USMS would then release
the image to anyone who requested it), with Christine Beckett, U.S. Marshals Service Explains
Mug Shot Release, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.rcfp.org/
browse-media-law-resources/news/us-marshals-service-explains-mug-shot-release (no, the
USMS would continue to refuse to release the image outside of the Sixth Circuit). In any
case, once a mug shot is publicly released in one jurisdiction, that successful requester
certainly may disseminate it to all other jurisdictions—the USMS need not release the image to additional requesters in order for it to garner nationwide attention. For example,
national news organizations were able to obtain Bernie Madoff’s FBI mug shot simply by
submitting their FOIA requests from one of the states encompassed within the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction. See Erik Sherman, Indicted Executive’s Mug Shots Are Exempt from FOIA,
INSIDECOUNSEL (June 1, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/06/01/indicted-exec
utives-mug-shots-are-exempt-from-foia.
16
See Beckett, supra note 15 (quoting David Gonzales, U.S. Marshal for the District of
Arizona, who said that the USMS releases mug shots to Sixth Circuit requesters because of
“a little wrinkle” in that circuit’s case law (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17
See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2012);
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 502 (11th Cir. 2011); Detroit Free Press, 73
F.3d at 93.
18
Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97–98 (holding that where an individual is the subject of
an ongoing criminal investigation and has already appeared in court, disclosure of his or
her mug shot “could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
[his or her] personal privacy”).
19
See World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827–28; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503.
20
Auerbach Memo, supra note 13, at 2–3. This rule is subject to exception, but those
exceptional situations are likely to be few and far between. See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text for further discussion of this memorandum and its probable
consequences.
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the issue: not only is there now a split among the circuits, but there is
also a conflict between the Sixth Circuit and a federal administrative
agency. This conflict is likely to lead to increased litigation, imposing
a high burden on the federal judiciary and potential FOIA-requester
plaintiffs.
In this Note, I first provide some background information about
this issue. I begin by reviewing the history and purpose of the FOIA. I
then outline various interpretations of the FOIA and its privacy exemptions, from the Supreme Court’s decisions on this general issue,
to the USMS’s mercurial policy on FOIA mug shot requests, to the
three circuit courts’ opinions specifically addressing the release of
mug shots under the FOIA.
Next, I evaluate the three circuit courts’ treatments of this issue
and outline a preferable approach for courts facing this issue in the
future. I argue against the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Detroit Free Press
that federal law enforcement agencies must release mug shots to
FOIA requesters. I assert that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits were
correct in concluding that federal agencies are not required to disclose mug shots in response to FOIA requests. Balancing the public
and individual interests at stake, I conclude, as these courts did, that
the public interest is ultimately outweighed by the individual’s legitimate privacy interest in his or her mug shot. But I argue that the
analysis required to reach this conclusion should include a more careful consideration of the interests at stake and the relevant precedent.
Finally, I explain why the current state of the law in this area is
undesirable and untenable, and I advocate for a prompt resolution to
the conflict among the circuits and branches of government. I further argue that my proposed solution is especially desirable because,
by acknowledging the importance of the interests at stake and weighing them accordingly in their interest-balancing analyses, courts would
actually emphasize the value of the individual’s privacy right and publicly reaffirm judicial commitment to its protection.
I
THE FOIA’S HISTORY

AND

PURPOSE

Eminent American statesmen and scholars have long touted the
importance of allowing citizens access to information about the actions of their government. As early as 1822, James Madison persuasively argued that an informed public is an essential element of a
functioning democracy, stating that “[k]nowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
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arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”21 As President Lyndon Johnson signed the original FOIA into law in 1966, he
argued that “democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able
to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.”22 Professor Joseph Stiglitz, a
Nobel Prize winner and former Chief Economist of the World Bank,
also recognized the right of the citizenry in a democratic nation to
know what its government is doing, asserting that there should be “a
strong presumption in favor of transparency and openness in government.”23 He believed this concern was especially relevant in light of
government agencies’ inclination to keep information secret.24 The
FOIA25 takes an important step toward implementing these lofty
21
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), quoted in DAVID M.
O’BRIEN, THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
29 (1981).
22
Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 895, 895 (July 11,
1966), quoted in Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The
“Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 46 (1994).
23
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, The World Bank,
Oxford Amnesty Lecture: On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse; The Role
of Transparency in Public Life 1 (Jan. 27, 1999), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/oxford-amnesty.pdf.
24
See id. at 9–13, 25–26 (discussing government officials’ potential evasions of their
FOIA obligations).
25
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). In relevant part, the statute reads:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
...
(3)(A) . . . [E]ach agency, upon any request for records which
(i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any),
and procedures to be followed, shall make the records
promptly available to any person.
...
(4)(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has
jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the
court shall . . . determine whether such records . . . shall be
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection
(b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action. . . .
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
...
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . (C) could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . .

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn303.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 7

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

25-FEB-14

14:30

639

ideals.26
In 1966, Congress enacted the FOIA as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act.27 The FOIA was the first American law to
guarantee all citizens the right to access information from their government.28 Its coverage is broad: it allows private individuals and
members of the press alike to access information from the government,29 and its information-release requirements apply to all federal
agencies.30
When Congress first enacted the FOIA, the Senate issued a statement explaining the purpose of the new law.31 While they referenced
the difficult task of balancing the opposing interests of public access
and government confidentiality, the statute’s framers indicated that
the FOIA was meant to “establish a general philosophy of full agency
disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language.”32 Congress expressed this same sentiment again
when it amended the FOIA in 1974 to further constrain federal agencies’ ability to deny public access to government information.33 The
26
At least one prominent legal scholar has theorized that Congress was actually required by the Constitution to pass the FOIA or a similar statute in order to secure the First
Amendment’s right to free speech. See Mike Dorf, Does the First Amendment Require the Freedom of Information Act?, DORF ON LAW (Dec. 2, 2009, 1:24 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/
2009/12/does-first-amendment-require-freedom-of.html. Professor Dorf argues that:
A, if not the, core concern of the First Amendment, is political speech to
facilitate self-government. In order for the People to know when and how
to criticize their government with an eye towards bringing about political
change, they must know what their government is doing. If the government can keep secret large swaths of its operations, the People will not be
able to learn such matters.
Id. This constitutional gloss on the FOIA is not within the scope of this Note. Nonetheless,
the suggestion that FOIA-exemption analyses have serious constitutional implications underscores how important it is for courts to conduct a careful, thorough analysis of the
interests at stake before allowing the federal government to withhold information from a
FOIA requester.
27
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
28
See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE
ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 44 (1999).
29
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 771 (1989) (“[T]he identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of
his or her FOIA request.”).
30
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
31
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 2–6 (1965).
32
Id. at 3. Though he was initially skeptical of the proposed law because he wanted to
preserve the executive’s ability to keep information confidential in the interest of national
security, President Johnson eventually did sign the FOIA into law. See O’BRIEN, supra note
21, at 7. He later stated that “freedom of information is so vital that only the national
security, not the desire of public officials or private citizens, should determine when it
must be restricted.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
See O’BRIEN, supra note 21, at 7–8 (noting that the amendments were a direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), that courts did
not have the authority to review the information that a federal agency had decided to
withhold from FOIA requesters under one of the statutory exemptions).
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FOIA was meant to be a comprehensive cure for the ill of unnecessary
governmental secrecy; therefore, it established a default position that
information should be disclosed to, rather than concealed from, the
public.34 Individuals or institutions that request information under
the FOIA need not explain their motivation for seeking the information.35 And if a federal agency refuses a FOIA request, it bears the
burden of justifying that decision if it is later challenged in court.36
However, the FOIA’s framers included nine exceptions to this
general rule of disclosure.37 Two of these, Exemptions 6 and 7(C),
relate to the individual’s right to privacy.38 Essentially, these exemptions establish that where the disclosure of information by a government agency would cause an “unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy,” the agency need not release that information.39 Importantly,
the FOIA exemptions do not impose an affirmative duty upon agencies to withhold exempted information. Rather, “agencies are free to
withhold information falling within one of [the] . . . exemptions, but
there is no requirement that they do so.”40
Though the FOIA’s privacy-interest exemptions are similar, they
differ in two important ways. First, Exemption 6 applies to “personnel
and medical files,” while Exemption 7(C) applies to “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.”41 Second, the exemptions differ in their protectiveness of the individual’s privacy
interest: Exemption 6 is triggered only where disclosure of the information in question “would constitute a clearly unwarranted” privacy invasion,42 whereas Exemption 7(C) is triggered when disclosure merely
“could reasonably be expected” to result in such an invasion.43 Exemption 7(C)’s coverage is broader than that of Exemption 6, meaning
that the FOIA provides more privacy protection for law enforcement
records than for personnel and medical records.44
34
See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); FOERSTEL, supra note
28, at 40.
35
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 771 (1989) (“[W]hether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the [FOIA] request for information is made.” (emphasis omitted)).
36
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 755.
37
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9).
38
See id. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C); supra note 25. This Note considers the right to privacy
only as it is created and defined by these FOIA provisions—not any privacy right that may
emanate from provisions of the Constitution.
39
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
40
Cate et al., supra note 22, at 49 (emphasis added).
41
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C).
42
Id. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis added).
43
Id. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added).
44
See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 562–64 (2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7c.pdf.
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II
THE FOIA’S PRIVACY EXEMPTIONS
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the FOIA’s Privacy
Exemptions
The Supreme Court has heard several challenges to federal agencies’ withholding of information to FOIA requesters under the statutory exemptions.45 Because the FOIA exemptions do not impose an
affirmative duty to withhold information,46 the Court in each of these
cases was asked to sanction the agency’s withholding of information—
it was asked not to require but to allow that action on the agency’s
part.47
Most of the Supreme Court’s FOIA privacy cases have hinged on
an interpretation of Exemption 6 of the FOIA.48 But any level of privacy-right protection that Exemption 6 provides also applies to cases
where Exemption 7(C) is invoked because Exemption 7(C) is more
protective of the individual privacy interest than Exemption 6.49 In
other words, Exemption 7(C) provides all of the privacy protection
that Exemption 6 provides, and more. For this reason, a thorough
review of the Court’s relevant cases should include decisions turning
both on Exemption 6 and on Exemption 7(C).
The Supreme Court’s first case involving privacy rights under the
FOIA was Department of the Air Force v. Rose.50 In Rose, student editors of
a law review had made a FOIA request that the Air Force release summaries of its ethics hearings in which the hearing subjects’ names
would have been redacted.51 Addressing the privacy implications of
this request, the Court noted that Exemption 6 required “a balancing
of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic
purpose of the [FOIA] to open agency action to the light of public
45
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487 (1994); Ray, 502 U.S. at 164;
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 749; U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
46
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
47
See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 489–90; Ray, 502 U.S. at 166–67; Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at
751–52; Rose, 425 U.S. at 354–59.
48
The Court has decided at least one case with possible FOIA privacy-right implications on the basis of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1 (1978). In ruling that the Constitution does not bestow upon the media the
right to access federal prison facilities, the Houchins Court did not reach the issue of
whether such access would be required under the FOIA because the news agency apparently did not raise that issue. But the Court implied that its analysis might change if the
request had arisen from a FOIA claim rather than a constitutional one. See id. at 14 (plurality opinion) (“The public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by the
guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.” (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49
See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
50
425 U.S. 352 (1976).
51
Id. at 355.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn303.txt

642

unknown

Seq: 10

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

25-FEB-14

14:30

[Vol. 99:633

scrutiny.”52 The Court held that release of the redacted summaries
would not necessarily constitute a “clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy such as would place it within the reach of Exemption 6.53
The next major FOIA privacy case decided by the Supreme Court
provides, arguably, the most important precedent for the cases involving requests for the release of mug shots. In United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court considered
whether “rap sheets” that were compiled and held by the DOJ must be
released upon FOIA request or if they were protected by Exemption
7(C).54 The Court recognized a significant privacy interest in the information collected in these rap sheets and held that this information
was not subject to FOIA release—in other words, that rap sheets are
protected by Exemption 7(C) and that the DOJ is under no obligation
to release them to FOIA requesters.55
In the course of its analysis, the Reporters Committee Court clarified
several important points with respect to the FOIA’s privacy exemptions. First, the Court adopted the same interest-balancing test in the
Exemption 7(C) context that it had first used in Rose, a case involving
Exemption 6.56 Second, in stating that Exemption 7(C) does not require an ad hoc balancing for each new case, the Court allowed lower
courts to engage in categorical balancing for certain types of information that might be requested on many separate occasions.57
The Court’s third point in this case is the most important in the
FOIA privacy jurisprudence for the purposes of this Note. Expanding
on the reasoning from Rose that had implicated the FOIA’s “basic purpose,” the Court outlined a three-part analysis for cases involving Exemption 7(C). First, the hearing court must determine whether the
privacy interest implicated in the case at hand is of the kind that Congress intended Exemption 7(C) to protect.58 Consistent with the language of the FOIA, the court should decide de novo whether the
requested information must be released, and the government agency
that seeks to withhold that information should bear the burden of
52

Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 381 (holding that the district court should inspect the summaries in camera
and then balance the public and privacy interests in their release).
54
489 U.S. 749, 751 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
See id. at 780.
56
Id. at 762 (“[T]he cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.” (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57
See id. at 778–79 (treating rap sheets in general as a single category of law enforcement record for the purpose of interest balancing and discussing the public and private
interests common to all rap sheets).
58
Id. at 762.
53
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showing that Exemption 7(C) does apply to the given situation.59 Second, if the agency carries its burden, the court must decide whether
the privacy-interest invasion that would result from the release of information is warranted.60 The Reporters Committee Court held that the
only public interest that warrants such an invasion is one that relates
to the FOIA’s central purpose—namely, for citizens to be informed
about the actions of their government.61 In other words, the only legitimate public interest for the purpose of Exemption 7(C) is an interest in “[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency’s
performance of its statutory duties.”62 Exemption 7(C) protects information about a private individual that does not relate to the agency’s
conduct.63 In the third and final step, the court should balance the
privacy interest that the Exemption was meant to protect against the
public interest in disclosure.64
This three-part analysis, which came to be known as the “central
purpose” test, is now an essential part of FOIA jurisprudence.65 It applies to this day in all cases where the government is attempting to
withhold information under the FOIA’s privacy exemptions.66
After Reporters Committee, the Court decided two more cases that
further clarified how courts should analyze the interests at stake as
they engaged in categorical balancing under the FOIA’s privacy exemptions. First, in United States Department of State v. Ray, the Court
ruled that Exemption 6 covered the names of Haitian deportees in
State Department documents and that the release of this information
59

See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771.
61
See id. at 771–73.
62
Id. at 773.
63
See id.; see also Cate et al., supra note 22, at 45 (summarizing and clarifying the
Reporters Committee holding as to the FOIA’s central purpose and arguing that “although
exemptions under the FOIA are permissive, not mandatory, agencies should be prohibited
from disclosing information about a private individual other than the requester, unless
that information sheds light on ‘what the Government is up to’”).
64
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776.
65
See Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1255 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cate
et al., supra note 22, at 53 (“The Court repeatedly returned to this basic point—that the
FOIA is designed to provide access to information about government, not information
maintained by the government about individuals.”).
66
See, e.g., Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). This case
involved Vincent Foster, Jr., former President Bill Clinton’s deputy counsel, who fatally
shot himself. See id. at 160–61. Foster’s family members argued that color photographs of
the death scene should not be subject to FOIA release because they fell under the ambit of
Exemption 7(C). The Supreme Court found that the family did have a privacy interest
under Exemption 7(C). See id. at 170. It also held that the FOIA requester had not met his
burden to show that the request implicated a legitimate public interest—here, the interest
in determining whether the government improperly performed its investigative duties. See
id. at 175. For this reason, the Court concluded that the balance tilted in favor of the
privacy interest and allowed the agency to withhold the requested information. See id.
60
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would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of the deportees’ privacy.67
In evaluating the privacy interest, the Court considered, among other
factors, the personal nature of the information sought, the fact that
the information was tied to specific individuals rather than being
anonymous, and the likelihood that those individuals would experience retaliation and social embarrassment if the information were released.68 Then, in United States Department of Defense v. FLRA, the Court
held that Exemption 6 also protected the names and home addresses
of nonunion workers.69 Employing the central purpose test from Reporters Committee, the FLRA majority characterized the public interest
as “negligible” because it did not further the FOIA’s purpose of allowing citizens to access information about the government’s
actions.70
B. The USMS’s Interpretation of the FOIA in the Mug Shot
Context
The USMS is a domestic law enforcement agency within the DOJ,
tasked to “protect, defend[,] and enforce the American justice system.”71 The USMS captures fugitives and noncompliant sex offenders.72 Additionally, it takes custody of every individual charged with a
federal offense, no matter which federal law enforcement agency
made the initial arrest.73 The USMS keeps these individuals in custody until they are either acquitted of the charged crime or convicted
and transferred to a federal prison.74 USMS officials take a mug shot
of each individual they arrest, and the USMS then catalogues and retains these images.75
As a federal agency, the USMS is subject to the FOIA’s information-disclosure requirements.76 However, the USMS ordinarily does
67

502 U.S. 164, 166, 175 (1991).
See id. at 175–76.
69
510 U.S. 487, 489 (1994).
70
Id. at 497–98.
71
U.S. MARSHALS SERV., STRATEGIC PLAN: 2012–2016, at 3 (2012), available at http://
www.usmarshals.gov/foia/strategic_plan-2016.pdf.
72
See id. at 3.
73
Defendants in Custody and Prisoner Management, U.S. MARSHALS SERV., http://www.us
marshals.gov/prisoner/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
74
Id.
75
See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477
(E.D. La. 1999).
76
See Auerbach Memo, supra note 13, at 2. The cases forming the circuit split that
this Note addresses all center around requests for mug shots produced and stored by the
USMS, but other federal law enforcement agencies, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, also are subject to FOIA requests. This analysis therefore applies to their operations
as well. However, for ease of reference in this Note, I will assume that the USMS is the
government agency that retains the image in question.
68
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not release mug shots to the public, even upon FOIA request.77
Therefore, for the most part, the public never sees these photos.78
But there are two exceptions to this general rule—situations where
the USMS does release mug shots. The first is where the release of the
mug shot would serve “a law enforcement function.”79 The primary
law enforcement function served by the release of a mug shot is to
apprehend a fugitive.80
The second exception is controversial. For years, the USMS had
a special policy for FOIA requests initiated within the Sixth Circuit:
when a FOIA mug shot request came from that jurisdiction, the USMS
would release the mug shot, no matter where the arrest occurred.81
The USMS adopted this policy in response to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice, which held that the
USMS must release mug shots to FOIA requesters.82 But the USMS
recently changed this policy. A memorandum from the DOJ Office of
General Counsel preserved the exception for disclosures that would
serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, but it directed the USMS
not to release mug shots otherwise, “regardless of where the FOIA request
originated, unless [the USMS] determines either that the requester has
made the requisite showing that the public interest in the requested
booking photograph outweighs the privacy interest at stake or that
other factors specific to the particular FOIA request warrant” their
release.83 The memorandum superseded all previous USMS policies
on the release of mug shots.84
This new policy represents an important shift not only in the
USMS’s treatment of FOIA mug shot requests but also in its deference
77

Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(7) (2013).
Not so for mug shots resulting from arrests by state or local law enforcement. Most
states tend to allow for the release of mug shots to the public, though this can be inconsistent across jurisdictions. See THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, POLICE
RECORDS: A REPORTER’S STATE-BY-STATE ACCESS GUIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS 4–23
(2008), available at http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/POLICE.pdf (collecting information about policies and practices regarding public access to mug shots from all fifty
states).
79
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(7).
80
See id. § 50.2(b)(8) (clarifying that the USMS policy of not disseminating mug shots
“is not intended to restrict the release of information concerning a defendant who is a
fugitive from justice”).
81
See Auerbach Memo, supra note 13, at 2–3; see also Brief of Appellees at 34, Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-10229) (citing, in a brief
by DOJ attorneys, instances where the USMS released mug shots in response to FOIA requests emanating from within the Sixth Circuit and acknowledging that “the Marshals Service cannot ignore the mandate of the Sixth Circuit with regard to requests for the release
of mug shots within that jurisdiction”).
82
73 F.3d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1996); see infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasoning and holding of Detroit Free Press).
83
Auerbach Memo, supra note 13, at 2–3 (emphasis added).
84
Id. at 1.
78
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to the Sixth Circuit’s precedent on this matter.85 By refusing to follow
the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the FOIA within that jurisdiction,
the USMS enters the murky territory of agency nonacquiescence.86
Conflicts of this kind between the federal judiciary and an administrative agency necessarily raise questions of separation of powers among
the branches of the federal government and who has the final say
when the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a question of statutory
interpretation.
This particular interbranch conflict is likely to lead to increased
litigation. Because the new USMS policy directly contravenes the
Sixth Circuit’s holding in Detroit Free Press, every time the USMS refuses a FOIA mug shot request from the Sixth Circuit, the requester
will have grounds to challenge this decision in federal district court.87
And because the long-standing Detroit Free Press rule is binding on all
of the district courts within the Sixth Circuit, these plaintiffs will almost certainly succeed on their claims at the district-court level. With
this policy shift, therefore, the USMS has virtually guaranteed that the
district courts of the Sixth Circuit will hear many cases where the
USMS has denied FOIA mug shot requests in contravention of the

85
Interestingly, this was not the first such change in USMS policy. In 2004, the USMS
issued a memorandum stating that it would no longer release mug shots to FOIA requesters within the Sixth Circuit. See Brief in Support of Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Detroit
Free Press at 8, Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:05CV71601 (E.D.
Mich. July 28, 2005) [hereinafter Brief in Support of Summary Judgment]. The Detroit
Free Press sued the DOJ, alleging that the agency had denied its FOIA mug shot request—
made from within the Sixth Circuit—in contravention of the Detroit Free Press holding. See
Complaint at 2–3, Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:05CV71601 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 25, 2005). But the district court never decided the issue on the merits: the
USMS changed its policy back to include the exception for FOIA requests originating from
the Sixth Circuit, then moved for summary judgment because it had released the mug
shots to the plaintiff, rendering the plaintiff’s claim moot. See Brief in Support of Summary
Judgment, supra, at 1, 5–7. In so doing, the DOJ acknowledged that “[w]hile USMS continues to disagree with the decision in [Detroit Free Press] . . . [it] is bound by the limited
holding of the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 5.
86
See, e.g., Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A decision by this
court, not overruled by the United States Supreme Court, is . . . binding on all inferior
courts and litigants in the . . . Circuit, and also on administrative agencies . . . .” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979)); Ithaca Coll. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (“While deference is to be given to an
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, it is the courts that have the final word
on matters of statutory interpretation.” (citations omitted)).
87
Indeed, this effect can already be seen within the Sixth Circuit. In July 2013, the
Detroit Free Press filed suit against the DOJ in the Eastern District of Michigan. Complaint, Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:13CV12939 (E.D. Mich. July 5,
2013). The complaint alleges that the Detroit Free Press made a FOIA request that the
DOJ release the mug shots of three defendants charged with public corruption, which
request the DOJ refused to grant. See id. at 2–5.
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Detroit Free Press holding—cases that the district courts are bound by
stare decisis to decide in favor of the FOIA-requester plaintiffs.88
C. Mug Shots, FOIA Exemption 7(C), and the Circuit Split
The USMS’s general policy not to release mug shots has given
rise to several cases in federal district courts, three of which have
reached the circuit courts on appeal. Though the Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on the public or privacy interest in mug shots under the
FOIA’s privacy exemptions, its precedent regarding Exemptions 6 and
7(C) informed the circuit courts’ decisions in these cases. In Detroit
Free Press, the Sixth Circuit held that mug shots were not subject to the
protection of Exemption 7(C) because the information conveyed by
mug shots was not private by nature.89 It distinguished Reporters Committee on the basis of the type of information sought and the extent to
which that information was already available to the public, holding
that “the very nature of rap sheets demands that they be accorded a
greater degree of privacy and protection from public scrutiny” than
mug shots.90 The court went on to hold that there was a legitimate
public interest in mug shots.91 The release of mug shots could serve
the FOIA’s purpose by, for example, revealing law enforcement’s mistakes or misconduct in making arrests.92
The Detroit Free Press holding has not been widely accepted.93 In
fact, it was explicitly rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Karantsalis v.
United States Department of Justice 94 and again by the Tenth Circuit in
World Publishing Co. v. United States Department of Justice.95 These courts
saw the issue completely differently from the Sixth Circuit: they recognized a robust privacy interest in mug shots,96 holding that this far
outweighed any possible public interest in the disclosure of those
images.97
88

See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96–97 (6th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing the information requested in Ray and FLRA on this basis).
90
Id. at 97.
91
See id. at 98 (“Public disclosure of mug shots in limited circumstances can . . . serve
to subject the government to public oversight.”).
92
Id.
93
Only three other courts have addressed the issue head-on: two circuit courts, see
infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text, and one federal district court, see Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D. La. 1999). All have
come to the opposite conclusion as the Sixth Circuit.
94
635 F.3d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 2011).
95
672 F.3d 825, 828–32 (10th Cir. 2012).
96
See id. at 829–30 (citing with approval the Karantsalis and Times Picayune courts’
framing of the privacy interest at stake); Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503 (stating that a mug
shot “raises a unique privacy interest because it captures an embarrassing moment that is
not normally exposed to the public eye”).
97
See World Publ’g, 672 F.3d at 831–32; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504.
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In evaluating the privacy interest at stake with the release of mug
shots, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits considered several factors.
Three reasons led both courts to weigh the individual privacy interest
heavily. First, mug shots link their subjects to criminal activity regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case.98 Second, these images capture an extremely embarrassing moment for the subject.99 Finally,
USMS mug shots are not generally available to the public.100 In addition, the World Publishing court considered the fact that mug shots can
have a long-lasting, stigmatizing effect for the subject.101
On the other side of the balancing test, the Karantsalis and World
Publishing courts quickly dismissed the FOIA requesters’ arguments,
concluding that the public interest not only was outweighed by the
privacy interest but was essentially nonexistent.102 Because they decided that the interest-balancing test under Exemption 7(C) clearly
favored the individual’s privacy interest, these courts held that the
USMS was under no obligation to release the mug shots to FOIA requesters.103 Thus, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings align
with the USMS’s position that mug shots should not normally be released to the public.
III
THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST IN DISCLOSURE VERSUS
INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVACY INTEREST

THE

A. The Circuit Courts’ Analyses in Mug Shot Request Cases
1. Detroit Free Press
In Detroit Free Press, the Sixth Circuit made several questionable
analytical moves that led it to conclude that mug shots are subject to
release upon FOIA request. Though the court rightly emphasized the
history and spirit of the FOIA, its characterization of the privacy interest at stake was seriously problematic. This characterization skewed
the court’s interest-balancing analysis, allowing it to conclude that the
USMS must disclose mug shots upon FOIA request.
98

See World Publ’g, 672 F.3d at 827–28; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503.
See World Publ’g, 672 F.3d at 828; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503.
100
See World Publ’g, 672 F.3d at 828; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503.
101
See 672 F.3d at 828.
102
See id. at 831 (“[T]here is little to suggest that releasing [mug shots] would significantly assist the public in detecting or deterring any underlying government misconduct.”); Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504 (“[T]he public obtains no discernable interest from
viewing the [mug shots], except perhaps the negligible value of satisfying voyeuristic
curiosities.”).
103
See World Publ’g, 672 F.3d at 831–32; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504.
99
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Though the Detroit Free Press court properly identified the central
purpose test from Reporters Committee,104 it erred in how it applied that
test to the situation at hand. The court first argued that mug shots are
not the kind of private interest that should be covered by the FOIA
privacy exemptions.105 The court went to great lengths to distinguish
the rap sheets at issue in Reporters Committee from mug shots to explain
why Exemption 7(C) should apply to the former but not the latter.
The court reasoned that because rap sheets are “compilations of many
facts that may not otherwise be readily available from a single source,”
they demand more protection from potential public exposure than do
mug shots.106 But the court did not explain why this difference
should be determinative.
Moreover, the availability of information from other sources has
not been determinative in the post–Reporters Committee privacy-exemption cases.107 In Ray, the first of two key cases that clarified and applied the central purpose test, the Supreme Court did not use this as a
factor in its decision making at all.108 And in FLRA, the Court acknowledged that the information in question—the home addresses of
nonunion employees—was commonly available through public
sources like telephone directories and voter-registration records.109
However, it reasoned that the individual’s privacy interest in a piece of
information was not negated merely because that information might
be “available to the public in some form.”110 The nonunion workers
still had a meaningful privacy interest in not having that information
released to FOIA requesters.111 In sum, the Court did not determine
an individual’s privacy interest in a piece of information based on how
available that information might be to the public. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s privacy-exemption precedent does not support the
Sixth Circuit’s position in Detroit Free Press that rap sheets are different
from mug shots because they are not readily available.
After establishing to its satisfaction that the case at bar did not fall
under the FOIA’s intended protections for individual privacy, the Detroit Free Press court then addressed the second part of the central pur104
See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing FOIA’s primary purpose).
105
See id. at 97.
106
Id.
107
Indeed, the Reporters Committee Court itself observed that availability of information
from other sources is not determinative. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989) (“[T]he fact that an event is not wholly
‘private’ does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
109
U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994).
110
Id.
111
See id. at 500–02.
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pose test. It attempted to explain exactly how the release of a mug
shot might serve the FOIA’s central purpose of letting the citizenry
know about their government’s activities. The court offered two reasons: first, that a mug shot might “reveal the government’s glaring
error in detaining the wrong person,” and second, that it might “reveal the circumstances surrounding an arrest and initial incarceration
of an individual in a way that written information cannot.”112 But this
argument, too, is unpersuasive. While these reasons may hold true for
individual mug shots, the link between mug shots as a category and
government action is simply too tenuous to justify so broad a rule.113
A mug shot is far more likely to provide information about the individual photographed than about the agency that keeps the record; therefore, this analysis under the central purpose test is misguided.
In addressing the third part of the central purpose test—the interest-balancing analysis—the Detroit Free Press court implicitly drew a
distinction between mug shots of arrestees whose names “have already
been made public and . . . have already made court appearances” and
those who have not.114 But this line drawing simply proves that the
court missed the essential privacy concern that attaches to the release
of mug shots: these images are extremely embarrassing and risk causing lasting, unjustified harm to the individual.115 The mere statement
of the fact that a person was arrested and charged with a crime is
potentially embarrassing, but it does not implicate privacy in the same
way that the release of a mug shot would. The potential harm is simply not as great.116 Furthermore, the likelihood for broad-ranging
publication is not the same—mug shots are sensational images, which
are easy to spread and hard to erase from the public memory.117 This
112

Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Supreme Court noted in Reporters Committee:
[I]n the typical case in which one private citizen is seeking information
about another[,] the requester does not intend to discover anything about
the conduct of the agency that has possession of the requested records.
Indeed, response to this request would not shed any light on the conduct of
any Government agency or official.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773
(1989).
114
Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95.
115
See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
116
See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting
that a mug shot “is a unique and powerful type of photograph . . . [that] is a vivid symbol of
criminal accusation, which, when released to the public, intimates, and is often equated
with, guilt”).
117
For example, many highly publicized mug shots become the subject of extensive
public comment. Recall, for example, the mug shot of Jared Loughner, who shot and
killed six people and wounded Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in 2011. News media
characterized his post-arrest photo as “spellbinding” and speculated about what possible
insights it might convey about the arrestee and his state of mind. See Dan Barry, Looking
Behind the Mug-Shot Grin, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/
113
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serves to compound the negative consequences for individual privacy
that result from the release of a mug shot.118 As a result, the court
undervalued the privacy interest at stake in the Detroit Free Press case,
erroneously concluding that the government did not meet its burden
of showing that the privacy exemption covers the requested information.119 This faulty reasoning led the court to conclude that the
USMS must release the requested mug shot because “disclosure of the
requested information could not reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”120
2. Karantsalis and World Publishing
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits correctly concluded that mug
shots should not be subject to mandatory release under the FOIA.
But their analyses of the public interest at stake in this situation, and
in FOIA privacy cases in general, were somewhat cramped. First, they
did not acknowledge that applying the central purpose test from Reporters Committee to cases involving FOIA requests for the release of a
mug shot is, in fact, an extension of that test.121 In Reporters Committee,
the court employed some language indicating that the fact that rap
sheets consist of “compiled” information was important to the central
purpose analysis.122 The cases involving mug shots might be distinguished on this basis because mug shots are not compilations of
pieces of information like rap sheets.123 To adequately respond to
16/us/16loughner.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Or look to Lindsay Lohan’s collection of
mug shots, each of which inspires a new wave of public interest in the actress and her legal
troubles. See, e.g., Richard Winton, Lindsay Lohan Mug Shot: Latest Police Photo Joins Growing
List, L.A. TIMES L.A. NOW BLOG (Mar. 20, 2013, 7:12 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/lanow/2013/03/lindsay-lohan-mug-shot-latest-joins-growing-list.html (noting that
Lohan’s most recent mug shot “garner[ed] lots of attention” and that “Lindsay Lohan mug
shot” was a popular Internet search shortly after the image was released (internal quotations omitted)).
118
Perhaps more accurately, the Sixth Circuit does acknowledge this imposition but
fails to take it at all seriously, stating that “the personal privacy of an individual is not
necessarily invaded simply because that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the
disclosure of information in the possession of government agencies.” Detroit Free Press, 73
F.3d at 97.
119
See id. at 96.
120
Id. at 98.
121
See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2012);
Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 502.
122
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 780 (1989) (noting that “the privacy interest . . . [is] at its apex” when the requested
“information is in the Government’s control as a compilation”).
123
FOIA-requester plaintiffs are quick to make this argument—indeed, this distinction
often forms the core of their arguments for compelling the USMS to release mug shots.
See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3–4, World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d
825 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5063) (explaining that rap sheets involve compiling of data
that might be erroneous and incomplete, whereas mug shots do not involve government
databases and the accumulation of information).
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this argument, a court should treat the first part of the central purpose test thoroughly, carefully articulating the reasons why Exemption
7(C) applies to the individual privacy interest in mug shots in the
same way it applied to rap sheets in Reporters Committee.124 In so doing,
the court should be mindful of the fact that the government agency
that withholds the information, not the individual or entity requesting
it, properly bears the burden of establishing that this first requirement
of the central purpose test is met.
Moreover, with respect to the second prong of the central purpose test, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits apparently concluded that
there is no public interest at stake in mug shot cases. This overstates
the point. Surely the FOIA’s history and purpose, the presumption
that information should normally be disclosed under the FOIA, and
the fact that the agency carries the initial burden to show that a privacy exemption applies to the situation, together indicate that there is
some public interest in the information.125 After all, the information is
produced and held by the government, and there is a chance, however slim, that it might further the FOIA’s central purpose of allowing
citizens to be informed about their government’s actions. Minimal
though it may be, a public interest does exist—it is simply outweighed
by the robust individual privacy interest in nondisclosure.
Ultimately, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ opinions are somewhat lacking in their analyses of the first step of the central purpose
test and the burden the government bears therein. However, this is
not a fatal flaw: both of these circuits ultimately come to the correct
conclusion that mug shots do fall under the protection of Exemption
7(C) and that the USMS therefore cannot be compelled to release
those images to FOIA requesters.126
B. Reweighing the Public and Private Interests to Apply the
Central Purpose Test More Effectively
Before attempting each step of the central purpose test and balancing the individual privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure, it is necessary to identify exactly what is at stake when courts
and parties talk about the individual’s “privacy interest” in his or her
mug shot.
124

See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762 n.12.
The argument that the public interest is not entirely negligible does not necessitate
a reconsideration of the Reporters Committee holding about categorical balancing. See supra
note 57 and accompanying text. It merely cautions that, for each new context in which a
court applies the central purpose test, the court should adequately consider each side of
the interest-balancing test before establishing a categorical rule for the type of information
in question.
126
See World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 830–32; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504.
125
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Defining the individual interest in privacy, even in the broadest of
terms, can be a very difficult task.127 Perhaps the most common definition of privacy is one of simple physical privacy—the right to be left
alone in one’s own space.128 A more nuanced view of the right to
privacy also encompasses the right to keep intimate communications
(in the form of letters, e-mails, telephone conversations, journal entries, or even one’s inner conversations with oneself) confidential.129
Undoubtedly, both of these definitions are correct. But the conception of the right to privacy that I find most appropriate and useful
in this context is somewhat more expansive.130 It focuses on control
of information about oneself: under this definition, “[p]rivacy is the
condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about
one possessed by others.”131 A person is stripped of privacy when his
or her personal information is entered into the public record because
the information becomes “public property.”132 The Supreme Court
has adopted this control-centric definition of privacy in its seminal
cases involving the FOIA’s privacy exemptions.133
This definition of the privacy right is appropriately applied to
photographs and is especially apposite for cases involving mug
shots.134 Mug shots capture the individual at a vulnerable, embarrassing moment.135 More than that, they provide a lasting visual link be-

127
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1153, 1157–58 (2004) (noting that privacy is “an unusually slippery concept” that nonetheless looms large in American law, politics, and society).
128
See LANE, supra note 7, at 1.
129
See id. at 1–2.
130
See generally W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269
(1983), reprinted in PRIVACY 105 (Eric Barendt, ed., Int’l Library of Essays in Law & Legal
Theory, 2d Ser., 2001). Parent emphasizes that while “privacy” as a concept certainly implicates questions of autonomy and freedom of choice, which many scholars take up in the
course of their privacy-right analyses, these are distinct from the right to privacy as defined
here. See id. at 272–74. So, while this definition of privacy is broader than the two previously mentioned, it is not unbounded.
131
Id. at 269. Although public sources like newspapers may reveal extremely personal
information, Parent limits his conception of the right to privacy with the word “undocumented,” meaning not present in any public record. See id. at 270–71.
132
Id. at 271.
133
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 763 (1989) (“[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”); see also
supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the Reporters Committee Court’s consideration of the FOIA privacy exemptions’ intended scope—i.e., what version of “privacy” they
were meant to protect).
134
See LANE, supra note 7, at 55–56 (detailing the historical rise of the opportunistic
use of unauthorized photographs of individuals and the corresponding reactions of
individuals).
135
See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011).
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tween the subject and criminality—a link that is very hard to break,
even if the individual is eventually cleared of all wrongdoing.136
Traditionally, photographs were thought to be objective, purely
representational images of individuals.137 But mug shots are different. More than simple records of an objective reality, they are connected to the subject’s identity in a complex way.138 Mug shots are
“image[s] . . . taken to indicate criminality.”139 In the past, many philosophers and scientists used mug shots to support their theories that
certain groups had inherently deviant natures, which were manifested
in their physical appearances.140 Inherent in the very existence of
mug shots is a judgment by the police that the individual is guilty of
some crime—a judgment that is made before any court or jury has a
chance to weigh in on the issue. This underscores the powerful, lasting impression that mug shots can leave on the public, even if the
person pictured is ultimately cleared of all wrongdoing. This impression of criminality can lead to social and professional stigmatization.141 In short, the effects of having one’s mug shot released
publicly could potentially be devastating. This is precisely the type of
information that the right to privacy, defined in terms of others’ inability to obtain undocumented personal knowledge about oneself,
should protect.
A number of different factors caution courts and scholars to pay
careful attention to the public interest at stake where the government
has invoked this exemption to withhold information. These include
the important, lofty goals underlying the FOIA; its default position of
disclosure; and the fact that, for the first step of the central purpose
test, the government bears the burden of showing that the claimed
privacy interest does fall within Exemption 7(C). All three of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue of FOIA requests for mug
shots correctly adopted the Reporters Committee central purpose test for
evaluating the public interest,142 but none of them has adequately jus136
See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of criminality that a mug shot carries, the potential negative consequences of a mug shot’s publication for the individual, and the difficulty that an individual might encounter in removing
his or her mug shot from the public record).
137
See FINN, supra note 5, at xi.
138
See PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 2, at 29.
139
FINN, supra note 5, at 1.
140
See FINN, supra note 5, at 11–23; PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 2, at 22–23.
141
See supra note 7. For a more academic discussion of this issue, see generally Charles
N. Davis, Expanding Privacy Rationales Under the Federal Freedom of Information Act: Stigmatization as Talisman, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 453 (2005) (explaining that the result of
releasing certain personal information, which the FOIA’s privacy exemptions would likely
protect, is to stigmatize the individual).
142
See, e.g., World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir.
2012); Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 502 (11th Cir. 2011); Detroit Free
Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96–98 (6th Cir. 1996).
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tified its extension to the mug shot release situation or adequately
considered the public interest in applying the test. A more precise,
careful application of the central purpose test would solve this
problem.
Fortunately, courts facing this issue are not wholly without guidance: the Reporters Committee reasoning is extremely useful here. At
first glance, the facts in mug shot release cases might not map perfectly onto the Reporters Committee privacy-exemption precedent because a mug shot captures a single moment in the criminal process
and does not compile different pieces of information in the way that a
rap sheet does.143 But the Reporters Committee precedent is nonetheless
applicable to mug shot request cases for two important reasons.
First, the privacy interests at stake with respect to rap sheets and
mug shots are similar in kind. Both types of information are records
that law enforcement creates and holds that are often unreported
publicly and that could cause extreme embarrassment, stigmatization,
and negative consequences for the subject if they are released.144 And
the individual lacks direct control over each of these types of information: he or she is forced to rely on the agency that holds the information to assert his or her privacy interest in the information.
Second, broad language in Reporters Committee about the individual right to privacy suggests that the central purpose test should be
the standard by which the public interest is evaluated in all FOIA privacy-exemption cases. The Reporters Committee Court stated that “a
third party’s request for law enforcement records or information
about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s privacy.”145
The application of the central purpose test in the mug shot context does extend that test’s coverage to a new category of information,
so courts that are asked to apply the test should be thorough in their
analyses of the Reporters Committee precedent. They should not gloss
too quickly over the first part of that three-part test: the government
143
See supra text accompanying notes 106–11, 122–23 (discussing whether the fact that
a requested document consists of a collection of different pieces of information is relevant
to its protectability under the FOIA’s privacy exemptions).
144
See World Publ’g, 672 F.3d at 829–30 (acknowledging “subtle differences” between
mug shots and rap sheets but nevertheless “draw[ing] a comparison between the sensitive
nature of the subject matter in a rap sheet, and the vivid and personal portrayal of a person’s likeness in a booking photograph”). But see Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97 (distinguishing mug shots from rap sheets).
145
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
780 (1989). Read carefully, this “reasonable expectation” language seems to invite courts
to apply the central purpose test in other FOIA privacy-exemption contexts and incorporate it into their balancing of the public and private interests. But “reasonable expectation” is not certainty—the central purpose test is not a per se rule establishing an
unshakeable privacy interest in all personal information held by government agencies.
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must prove to the court that the claimed privacy interest is, in fact,
one which the FOIA exemption was intended to cover and one to
which it should apply in the instant case. If the court is satisfied that
the government has carried its burden, only then should it analyze the
legitimacy of the public interest and balance it against the privacy
interest.
The analyses of courts facing this issue in the future should follow
these basic lines: although the public interest is real and recognizable
given the value of an informed public and the FOIA’s stated goal of
disclosure, the individual’s privacy interest in his or her mug shot is
simply too great to be disregarded. When a law enforcement agency
releases a mug shot for the public to view, the pictured arrestee, who
often has not yet been tried or convicted of the crime for which he or
she was arrested, loses control over previously undocumented personal information. As a result of the mug shot’s publication, the arrestee likely will suffer great embarrassment, stigmatization, and negative
consequences in his or her professional and personal life.146 For this
reason, the individual privacy interest outweighs the public interest,
and federal law enforcement agencies should be free to withhold mug
shots from FOIA requesters as they see fit.
Every step of the central purpose analysis is important because
together, they ensure that both the public and private interests receive
their due consideration in each new FOIA-exemption case. In particular, courts must not skip over the public interest analysis in the face
of statutory exemptions that threaten to “swallow the [FOIA’s disclosure] presumption whole.”147
CONCLUSION
Currently, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Detroit Free Press is in conflict with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ precedent and the USMS’s
general policy not to release the mug shots it takes.148 This is an undesirable and inequitable situation. Every circuit split creates inconsistencies in the application of federal law, which puts pressure on the
legal system generally.149 But this particular split has more disturbing
consequences for individual arrestees and for the relationship of the
branches of the federal government.
146

See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
Beall, supra note 65, at 1251 n.6.
148
See supra text accompanying notes 12–19.
149
See, e.g., Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56
LOY. L. REV. 535, 541–44 (2010) (describing the important role of uniformity in the federal
justice system); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1171–74 (2012) (arguing that circuit-court disuniformity undermines judicial authority and impedes development of constitutional
norms).
147
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If the USMS honors FOIA requests for mug shots originating in
the Sixth Circuit, that information may easily become public in all
other jurisdictions—including those where the courts have ruled that
the USMS need not release the mug shots. In this way, individuals or
organizations may easily work around the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ prohibition of the release of mug shots by originating their
FOIA requests from within the geographical bounds of the Sixth Circuit. The firm rule of nondisclosure that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits established is thus rendered essentially toothless.
But if the USMS refuses to follow the Sixth Circuit’s precedent, as
it recently did, another set of problems arises. This refusal raises separation-of-powers questions about whose statutory interpretation—that
of the administrative agency or the Court of Appeals—should trump
in the absence of Supreme Court or congressional input. A related
concern is the issue of agency nonacquiescence, which has long been
a topic of debate in the federal appellate courts. Finally, there is the
practical concern about what negative effect the increased litigation
stemming from the USMS’s new policy will have on district courts in
the Sixth Circuit.
This intercircuit, interbranch split on how to interpret the FOIA
should therefore be resolved as soon as possible. A legislative solution
might be the best option.150 But Congress does not seem inclined to
address the issue anytime soon. This leaves three possible judicial
remedies. First, the Sixth Circuit might sit en banc to overrule its decision in Detroit Free Press that the USMS must release mug shots upon
FOIA request. The court will almost certainly have the opportunity to
reconsider Detroit Free Press, given the increased litigation that the
USMS’s new policy will trigger on the issue.151 Second, the Supreme
Court could weigh in on this issue, resolving the conflict among the
circuits and the branches by overruling Detroit Free Press. Again, the
increased litigation that the USMS’s new policy will engender will
probably present the Court with ample opportunity to do this.
Notably, both of these alternatives would take quite some time to
come into effect. In the interim, a third option—which is, admittedly,
only a partial remedy—might provide some protection to individual
arrestees and a fair, predictable process for FOIA requesters. The majority of U.S. jurisdictions have no binding precedent on whether Exemption 7(C) allows the USMS to withhold mug shots from FOIA

150
See Gregory Nathaniel Wolfe, Note, Smile for the Camera, the World Is Going to See That
Mug: The Dilemma of Privacy Interests in Mug Shots, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2227, 2270–72 (2013)
(arguing that Congress should pass a law protecting all mug shots—state and federal—
from disclosure absent some “compelling justification for release”).
151
See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
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requesters.152 If and when the USMS’s withholding of these images is
challenged in jurisdictions that have not previously ruled on the issue,
those courts should adopt the approach I outline in this Note. They
should carefully apply the central purpose test, remaining mindful of
the burden the government bears to show that Exemption 7(C) does
apply to this situation and the potential public interest in disclosure,
recognizing the importance of the privacy interest at stake, and ruling
accordingly.
By rebalancing the public and private interests with more careful
consideration of the elements of the central purpose test, including
the public interest and the burden the government agency should
bear to show that Exemption 7(C) actually applies, courts would actually reaffirm the importance of the privacy interest at stake. Though
this result is somewhat unexpected, it makes intuitive sense: by explaining the privacy interest thoroughly and requiring the government to fully support its withholding of allegedly private information,
courts would acknowledge how truly vital the individual’s privacy interest is. This underscores the real, continuing importance of the individual’s control over the personal information contained in his or
her mug shot by noting that the privacy interest is not merely presumed to be present in every FOIA case. Rather, it is reevaluated
under the central purpose test and reaffirmed with each new application of the FOIA’s privacy exemptions.

152
Indeed, the only federal courts to address the issue are the Sixth Circuit in Detroit
Free Press, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 73 F.3d 93 (6th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit in
Karantsalis v. U.S. Department of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit in
World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012), and the
Eastern District of Louisiana in Times Picayune Publishing Corp. v. United States Department of
Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D. La. 1999). This remains an open issue in every other U.S.
jurisdiction.

